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In this article it is argued that, instead of enhancing equal oppor-
tunities for men and women in the labor market, the EC
Pregnancy Directive No. 92/85 has reinforced the public/private
dichotomy. By liiing the pregnancy/maternity issue out ofthe equal-
ity debate, the Pregnancy Directive has made pregnancy/maternity a
sui generis category that is incomparable to any other situation a
worker may find himself/herself in. Following the Aristotelian
equality paradigm, the worker who falls within the scope of the
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Pregnancy Directive may be treated differently from a worker in
any other situation. That does not necessarily lead to a victory for
working women, as will be illustrated by the European Court of
Justice's decisions in Boyle and Lewen. The conclusion of the arti-
cle is that the equality theory must be the background for any
discussion concerning the accommodation of pregnant workers
and the creation of equal opportunities for men and women in the
labor market.
INTRODUCTION
Despite protective legislation and affirmative action, working
women in the European Communities' (EC) continue to be taken less
seriously than their male competitors. While some employers may sim-
ply dislike women, doubt their abilities, or think that their place is in
the home,2 this article presumes that most sex discrimination in the EC
labor market is economically rational.3 Employers believe that the aver-
age female employee is a bad investment. In a free market economy,
employers want employees to maximize their work with no interruption
in time. The possibility that women may decide to have children is an
important reason not to hire them. Even women who do not actually
plan to start a family may similarly suffer from what economists call
"statistical discrimination," which is, discrimination against women
based on the stereotype that they all will inevitably interrupt their ca-
reers to have and raise children.! Therefore, employers conclude that the
1. The European Communities (EC) are: the European Community (originally estab-
lished in 1957 as the European Economic Community (EEC)), the European Atomic
Energy Community (established in 1951) and the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (established in 1951). The Treaty on European Union (1992) established a
legal link between the 3 Communities and the supplementary policies and forms of
cooperation between the Communities and their (currently fifteen) Member States.
See KOEN LENAERTS & PIET VAN NUFFEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 1-10 (Robert Bray ed., 1999) (containing detailed information regarding the
European Communities and Union).
2. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCIMINATION 39-40 (2d ed.
1971) (claiming an employer's subjective "taste for discrimination" leads to discrimi-
nation because they do not like to be associated with women).
3. See, e.g., Anne Lofaso, Pregnancy and Parental Care Policies in the United States and
the European Community: What Do They Tell Us About Underlying Societal Values?, 12
COMp. LB. LJ. 458, 465-66 (1991).
4. Richard Posner defined statistical discrimination against women as follows: "[It may
be rational for employers to discriminate against women because of the information
costs of distinguishing a particular female employee from the average female em-
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expected return from the average woman to the company is lower than
that of the average man.
The primary causes for a woman's career interruption include
childbirth, breastfeeding and childrearing. Childbirth and breastfeeding
are biologically imposed on the mother and temporarily prevent her
from contributing to the world of paid labor. In addition to these bio-
logical constraints, female workers tend to take a leave of absence, or
quit their jobs more often than men in order to raise children.
Childbirth and breastfeeding are biological phenomena specific to
women, which (for the time being at least) cannot be altered. By con-
trast, the belief that women will take a leave of absence because their
natural role is that of a caretaker for children is not connected with bi-
ology, but involves "a [broader] spectrum of issues focusing not only on
women's role in the work force but on the domestic division of labor
between men and women."5 This distinction between childbirth and
breastfeeding on the one hand, and childrearing on the other, exempli-
fies the difference between sex and gender. Childbirth and breastfeeding
are sex issues, with sex being defined as a biological category. Childrear-
ing relates to gender, with gender usually being defined as a socially
constructed category.6
The accommodation by employers of pregnancy and breastfeeding
necessarily constitutes the very first step towards the full integration of
women in the workforce.7 It seems impossible to tackle discrimination
based on the belief that a woman's natural role is that of a caretaker for
ployee." Richard Posner, An EconomicAnalysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. Ci
L. REv. 1311, 1320 (1989). See also GEORGE J. BORJAS, LABOR ECONOMICS 333
(1996). For a very good discussion of statistical/economically rational discrimination,
see Cass R. Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, in CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
FREE MARKETS AND SocItaJuscE 151, 155-57 (1997).
5. Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating
the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L REv. 2154, 2156 n.8 (1994) (citation omit-
ted). I do not agree with Richard Posner's statement: "[C]hild-rearing is an area
where nature dominates culture.. . ." Posner, supra note 4, at 1315.
6. See MARCIA MOBILIA BOUMIL & STEPHEN C. HICKS, WOMEN AND THE LAW 27
(1992); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAw 200 (1990); Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit ofManhood and the
Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REv. 499, 503 (1991). Catharine
MacKinnon, however, thinks that the importance of biology to the condition of
women is the social meaning attributed to it. According to her, biology is its social
meaning for purposes of analyzing the inequality of the sexes. She therefore tends to
use sex and gender relatively interchangeably. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 263 n.5 (1987).
7. See Issacharoff& Rosenblum, supra note 5, at 2156.
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children (i.e. gender discrimination), before tackling discrimination on
grounds of pregnancy/breastfeeding (i.e. sex discrimination). It would
be overly optimistic to start with the more complicated gender dis-
crimination without first resolving the easier sex discriminatory aspects
of women's position in the labor market. After all, changing cultural
patterns and attitudes through law is much more difficult than legally
fighting discrimination on the basis of clear biological facts.
8
As the main preoccupations of the EC are primarily economic (i.e.
the creation of a common market in the Member States), the Treaties
establishing the EC do not contain many references to either sex or
gender equality. The right to sex or gender equality was originally (i.e.
at the time of establishment of the European Communities) believed to
have no connection whatsoever with the creation of a common market.
The one exception is Article 141 of the EC Treaty, which requires the
EC Member States to ensure equal pay for equal work or work of equal
value for men and women.9 This Article was-of course-introduced
into the Treaty for economic purposes. It was meant to preclude com-
petitive advantages for Member States who hired women at lower wages
than men. At a later stage, this Article became the heart of a more gen-
eral principle of equality between men and women in employment.
Although the EC now attempts to uphold the principle of equality be-
tween men and women (the distinction between sex and gender equality
is usually not made in the EC), their equality legislation often reinforces
gender inequality by cementing women into their traditional roles of
childbearer and child caregiver.
This article discusses the EC's legal accommodation of pregnancy
in the workplace and the interpretation thereof by the European Court
of Justice. ° The leitmotiv is the question to what extent such accommo-
dation enhances women's position in the labor market. The suspicion
8. See Hans-Heinrich Trute et al., Equality of Sexes, 11 EUR. REV. PUB. L. 485, 487
(1999).
9. TEATr ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957, Art. 141 (for-
merly article 119) Oj. (C 340) 181 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]; as amended
and renumbered by the TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EURO-
PEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND
CERTAIN RELATED AcTs, Oct. 2, 1997, Oj. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY
OF AMSTERDAM].
10. The European Court of Justice, which is situated in Luxembourg, has the principal
responsibility of interpreting the contents of the Treaties establishing the European
Communities and the European Union, and the legislation passed pursuant to those
Treaties, and to insist upon their recognition and application. For more information,
see KOEN LENAERTS & DIRK ARTS, PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
(Robert Bray ed., 1999).
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being that, in a well-intentioned attempt to fight discrimination of
women, the EC institutions entrench gender discrimination. In other
words, in their attempt to fight sex discrimination (by accommodating
pregnancy), the EC often places women in a position that confirms the
traditional perception of women as childbearers and caregivers.
I. THE PROHIBITION OF SEX AND PREGNANCY
DISCRIMINATION IN EC LEGISLATION
Article 141 of the EC Treaty inspired all measures regarding equal-
ity between men and women in employment. Over the years, Article
141 has formed the legal basis for a number of directives" with respect
to pay, employment and vocational training, as well as aspects of statu-
tory and occupational social security.'2 None of these directives,
however, prohibit discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in particu-
lar. Only the Equal Treatment Directive, adopted in 1976, refers to
unequal treatment on the basis of pregnancy. Yet, it appears to allow,
rather than prohibit, such unequal treatment, and therefore arguably
permits discrimination on the basis of sex in some circumstances.
The Equal Treatment Directive generally prohibits sex discrimina-
tion in regard to employment, including promotion, vocational training
and working conditions. 3 Sex discrimination is defined as discrimina-
tion "on grounds of sex either directly or indirectly by reference in
particular to marital or family status."' 4 The directive thus prohibits
11. Directives are measures that have binding force in relation to the result to be achieved
for each Member State to which they are addressed, but leave the Member States free
to choose the form and methods of implementation. EC TRATY art. 249. There is
no dear legal parallel for this legal instrument in national or international law. See
P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE
EuRoPEAN COMMUNITIES 326-331 (Laurence W. Gormley ed., 3d ed. 1998).
12. Council Directive 75/117 EEC, O.J. (L 45) 19 (1975) [hereinafter Equal Pay Direc-
tive]; Council Directive 76/207 EEC, Oj. (L 39) 40 (1976) [hereinafter Equal
Treatment Directive]; Council Directive 79/7 EEC, O.J. (L 6) 24 (1997); Council
Directive 86/378 EEC, O.J. (L 225) 40 (1986); Council Directive 86/613 EEC,
Oj. (L 359) 56 (1986).
13. The idea behind this Directive was that the rule of equal pay for equal work as origi-
nally laid down in Article 141 was an empty box as long as women were
discriminated against with respect to employment and vocational training, and with
respect to working conditions. For a legislative history of the Directive, see CATH-
ERINE HosKYNs, INTEGRATING GENDER: WOMEN, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION 99-107 (1996).
14. Artide 2(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive.
2002]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
both overt and covert discrimination.15 However, it does not clarify
whether discrimination on grounds of pregnancy qualifies as direct (i.e.,
overt) or indirect (i.e., covert) sex discrimination, or if it even consti-
tutes sex discrimination at all. Still, the EC legislators hinted that it
would allow a well-defined form of unequal treatment of men and
women on the basis of pregnancy; the Directive allowed protective
measures for pregnant women and women who have just given birth.
In the early 1970s when the Equal Treatment Directive was nego-
tiated, the legal systems of many Member States contained special
protective measures for pregnant women and for their unborn chil-
dren. 6 During negotiations, the question arose as to how to solve the
tension between the sex equality principle on the one hand, and the ex-
isting special protective provisions on the other. 7 After all, special
protection for women implies unequal treatment of men.
Eventually, the Member States decided to allow deviation from the
equal treatment principle. Article 2(3) of the Equal Treatment Directive
provides that "this Directive shall be without prejudice to provisions
concerning the protection of women, particularly as regards pregnancy
and maternity." 8 At the time of its adoption, Article 2(3) was believed
to relate to measures like maternity leave.
15. For example, an employer who bluntly refuses to hire a woman because she is a
woman, directly/overtly discriminates on grounds of sex; whereas an employer who
offers less attractive benefits to part-time (usually female) rather than full-time (usu-
ally male) employees indirectly/covertly discriminates on grounds of sex, i.e., part-
time work can be used as a proxy for sex.
16. Special protective legislation for women emerged in Western Europe in the latter part
of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century, long before the
EC came into existence. Member States prohibited night work for women, limited
the number of hours they could work, and even excluded women altogether from
certain kinds of jobs, for example, work in mines. The underlying idea was that
women were weak and should be protected. Their place was thought to be at home
with their children, and not in the male world of paid labor. In the latter half of the
twentieth century, many Member States developed apparently more genuine health
and safety measures, controlling female exposure to certain substances associated with
reproductive risks, such as zinc and lead. Many of those measures, however, con-
cerned jobs that involved reproductive hazards for both sexes. See OLIvE BANKS,
FACEs OF FEMINISM 106 (1981); Helen Fenwick, Special Protections for Women in
European Union Law, in SEx EQUALITY LAw IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 63, 67-68
(Tamara K. Hervey et al. eds., 1996); RuTH NIELSEN & ERIKA SzyszczAK, THE So-
ciA. DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY 260 (2d ed. 1993); Valerie
Cromack, The E.C. Pregnancy Directive-Principle or Pragmatism?, 1993 J. Soc.
WELFARE & F m. L. 261,262.
17. Fenwick, supra note 16, at 63.
18. Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 12, Art. 2(3).
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The main guideline for the interpretation of Article 2(3) should be
the EC Court of Justice's fixed case law suggesting that exceptions to the
equality principle of the Equal Treatment Directive are to be narrowly
construed. 9 This was also the European Commission's view. 20 The word
"pregnancy" offers little room for interpretation. "Maternity," however,
is a concept that has both sociological and biological connotations. If
Cmaternity," as used in Article 2(3), ought to be read as referring to the
sociological concept of being a mother, this would imply that women
can be treated differently with respect to everything that touches upon
their status as mothers. That could not have been the aim of Article 2(3)
of the Equal Treatment Directive since women, in their sociological
position as mothers, are not different from men in their position as fa-
thers. That is the idea that the EC conveys in many of their enforceable
and non-enforceable documents.2'
It seems more reasonable to assume that the Equal Treatment Di-
rective provides for the possibility of treating women differently when
they are not in the same situation as men. In this respect, and taking
into account that the Directive mentions "pregnancy" and "maternity"
in the same breath, the interpretation of "maternity" should be strictly
limited to the time, immediately after delivery, that a mother needs for
physical recovery.2 In other words, Article 2(3) of the Equal Treatment
19. See, e.g., Case 222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
[1986] E.C.R. 1651, 1663. Regarding Art. 2(4), see, e.g., Case C-450/93, Kalanke v.
Freie Hansestadt Bremen, [1995] E.C.R. 1-3051, 3078.
20. SACHA PREcHAL & NOREEN BuRRows, GENDER DIScRIMINATION LAW OF THE EuRo-
PEAN COMMUNITY 110 (1990).
21. In the eighth consideration of the Preamble to the Framework Agreement on Paren-
tal Leave, for example, the Council of the EC stated: "Whereas men should be
encouraged to assume an equal share of family responsibilities, for example they
should be encouraged to take parental leave by such as awareness programmes."
Council Directive 96/34, Oj. (L 145) 4, 6 (1996) [hereinafter ParentalLeave Direc-
tive]. Susan Cox voiced the opinion that "it is inherently sex discriminatory, and
profoundly undermining of the development of equality of opportunity, for only
women to have the right to time off work to develop a 'special relationship' with their
children." Susan Cox, Maternity and Sex Discrimination Law: Where Are We Now?,
1997 EQUAL Opp. REv. 23, 29.
22. Prechal and Burrows warn that a wider interpretation can also be defended:
According to the Commission this paragraph of Article 2 refers only to the
protection of women needed because of pregnancy and the bearing of
children; in other words, it deals with physical protection. However, in
that case, it is not dear what is meant by maternity (the days or weeks
following a confinement?). Moreover, the provision refers to 'provisions
concerning the protection of women, particularly (emphasis added) as
20021
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Directive should be read only to allow unequal treatment of female
workers as far as the real biological differences between men and women
are concerned, such as pregnancy and the short period after delivery
which the mother needs for physical recovery.
However, the European Court of Justice has interpreted Article
2(3) of the Equal Treatment Directive much more broadly than what
was suggested above. In doing so, the Court has often endangered
women's position in the labor market, by simply reinforcing women in
their traditional roles of childbearers and child caregivers. The Court
has backed the opinion that women should stay at home and should not
enter the market place. The Hofmann case is the clearest example. 3 In
that judgment, the Court brought within the scope of Article 2(3) a no-
tion of maternity leave that was not restricted to the limited period
necessary for physical recovery after childbirth, and thereby allowed un-
equal treatment of women workers that went further than was intended
by Article 2(3).
In Hofinann, a young father applied to the German authorities re-
questing the same extended maternity leave and concomitant pay to
which the mother of his child was entitled.24 When the authorities re-
fused to give him the benefit because it was reserved for mothers, he
claimed that the refusal was discriminatory, not only against him, but
also against the mother of his child. The European Court of Justice re-
jected Hofmann's claim. In doing so, it reinforced the stereotypical idea
that women, and not men, should take care of newborn babies.25 The
regards pregnancy and maternity'. Such wording suggests a wider field of
application than the Commission's interpretation.
PECHAL. & BuRows, supra note 20, at 111.
23. Case 184/83, Hofmann v. Barmer Ersatakasse, 7 E.C.R. 3047 (1984).
24. Under German law, women could not be employed during the eight weeks that fol-
lowed childbirth. Mothers were entitled to extended maternity leave from the end of
said eight-week period until the day on which the child attained the age of six
months. There was no provision for paternity leave and pay. See Hofmann, supra
note 23, at 3049-3050 (citing Gesetz zum Schutz der erwerbstatigen Mutter (Mut-
terschutzgesetz) v.18.4.1968 (BGBL.IS.315); Gesetz zum Schutz der erwerbstatigen
Mutter (Mutterschutzgesetz) v.25.6.1979 (BGBL.IS.797).
25. Pannick stated:
The major defect of the ECJ judgment in Hofmann is its failure to explain
that any more than six months special leave for a mother following con-
finement would breach the principle of equal treatment in the Directive by
accepting different treatment of men and women by reason only of stereo-
typed assumptions about the respective roles of the mother and the father
in rearing a child.
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Court emphasized the public (male)/private (female) dichotomy, and
failed to recognize that traditional ideas about women's tasks in the pri-
vate sphere prevent women from being equal in the public sphere. In
other words, it failed to see the gender discriminatory effect of its own
interpretation of the Equal Treatment Directive.2 6 By allowing periods
of childcare to be called "maternity" leave, the Court allowed Member
States to maintain the unequal treatment of women that is entirely in-
spired by traditional societal ideas on how women-and not men-
should behave, irrespective of any biological difference between the
sexes. This is an instance of gender discrimination that endangers
women's chances in the labor market. The legal acceptance of the idea
that women are better placed to care for babies, and the reservation of
related benefits to women, turns them into less attractive employees.
II. THE PREGNANCY DIREcTrvE
In 1992, the EC institutions further implemented Article 2(3) of
the Equal Treatment Directive by adopting a new legislative rule, the
Pregnancy Directive.27 From a legal-technical point of view, the Preg-
nancy Directive was not adopted on the basis of Article 141, but on the
basis of the old Article 118a of the EC Treaty, which offered a legal
ground for qualified majority decisions concerning the improvement of
the health and safety of all workers in the workplace.28 The Directive
DAVID PANNICK, SEx DISCRUMINATION LAW 130 (1985). Also, Rubenstein noted that
"[m]aternity leave beyond the point where a woman is capable of returning to work is
positive action beyond that required by sex discrimination law". Michael Rubenstein,
Understanding Pregnancy Discrimination: A Framework for Analysis, 1992 EQuAL
Opv. REv. 22, 27.
26. See Cathryn L. Claussen, Incorporating Women's Reality into Legal Neutrali y in the
European Community: The Sex Segregation of Labor and the Work-Family Nexu" 22
LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 787, 795 (1991); Kirsten Scheiwe, EC Law's Unequal
Treatment of the Family: The Case Law of the European Court ofJustice on Rules Pro-
hibiting Discrimination on Grounds of Sex and Nationality, 3 Soc. & LEGAL STUD.
243, 252-54 (1994).
27. Council Directive 92/85/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 348) 1 [hereinafter Pregnancy Directive].
According to Article 14(1) the Directive was to be implemented within two years of
its adoption, i.e. October 19, 1994. For a report on implementation of the Pregnancy
Directive, see Sacha Prechal & Linda Senden, Implementation of Directive 92/85
(Pregnant Workers). Special Report 1995 of the Network of Experts on the Implementa-
tion of the Equality Directives (document number V/1717/96-EN).
28. Article 118a was introduced into the Treaty (at that time still called EEC Treaty.
Compare footnote 1) by the Single European Act (1986). The Treaty of Amsterdam
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was also inspired by the 1989 Health and Safety Directive which pro-
vided that "particularly sensitive groups must be protected against the
dangers which specifically affect them,"29 and by the Action Program for
the Implementation of the Community Charter on the Fundamental
Social Rights of the Workers, which included, among its aims, the
adoption of a directive for the protection of pregnant women at work.3"
It should be considered at least problematic that the Pregnancy Di-
rective has been adopted as a specific implementation of the Health and
Safety Directive, and not a specific derogation from the Equal Treat-
ment Directive. In doing so, attention was drained away from the Equal
Treatment Directive and its limited number of exceptions, including
protection of women as regards pregnancy and maternity.3 One could
argue that, as directives, the Equal Treatment and Health and Safety
merged the old Articles 118, 118a and Article 2 of the Agreement on Social Policy
(1992 O.J. (C 224) 127). This merger resulted in the new Article 137. It was neces-
sary to resort to Article 118a, as the United Kingdom was vigorously opposed to
widening the ambit of social policy measures in EC law. E.g., Evelyn Ellis, Protection
of Pregnancy and Maternity, 22 INDUS. L. J. 63, 64 (1993); Ellen E. Hodgson, Sex
Discrimination on Grounds of Pregnancy in European Community Law: The Case of
Great Britain, 2 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & Pof'Y 245, 287 (1993).
29. Council Directive 89/391, art. 15, 1989 O.J. (L 183) 1, 7.
30. Communication from the Commission Concerning its Action Programme Relating
to the Implementation of the Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Work-
ers, COM(89)568 final at 36-37. The Community Charter on the Fundamental
Social Rights of Workers was adopted on December 9, 1989, by eleven of the then
twelve Member States of the EC.
The United Kingdom did not feel that it was appropriate for it to be a party to
the Charter since it was of the firm opinion that many of the matters addressed by
the Charter were not within the Community's competence, and were, therefore a
matter for regulation on a national level by the Member States.
Philippa Watson, The Community Social Charter, 28 COMMON MKr. L. Rxv.
37, 37 (1991). The text of the Community Charter has not been officially published.
For a private publication, see ROGER BLANPAIN & CHRIS ENGELS, EUROPEAN LABOUR
LAW 441-448 (1998).
31. Noreen Burrows mentioned that "[the] linkage [between the Equal Treatment and
Pregnancy Directives] has been dropped in the Council's agreed position, although
the two directives must obviously be read together." Noreen Burrows, Maternity
Rights in Europe-An Embryonic Legal Regime, 11 Y.B. EuR. L. 273, 289 (1991).
Helen Fenwick also highlighted that:
[T]he draft of the Directive was based on Article 118A which authorises
Directives on the health and safety of workers, thereby avoiding the re-
quirement of unanimity. This procedural manoeuvere was highly
significant, since it led to characterisation of the Directive as one concerned
with the health and safety rights of pregnant women and new mothers, al-
though it also supported the equal treatment principle.
Fenwick, supra note 16, at 74.
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Directives are on par in the EC legal hierarchy and that, as a conse-
quence, neither one should take priority over the other. While this may
be true, one should not forget that the Equal Treatment Directive is a
specification of the equality principle, which is one of the basic princi-
ples of EC law.32 To that extent one should expect the Pregnancy
Directive to be consistent with the Equal Treatment Directive; however,
as will be highlighted below, the Pregnancy Directive is often at odds
with the principle of sex equality in employment.
The Pregnancy Directive contains in its preamble a clause stating
that protective measures for pregnant workers "should not treat women
on the labor market unfavourably nor work to the detriment of direc-
tives concerning equal treatment for men and women." 33 Nevertheless,
the Pregnancy Directive provides two types of protective measures: re-
strictive/negative protective measures and enhancing/positive protective
measures. Restrictive/negative measures exclude pregnant women from
certain job functions or working conditions, for example, work in
mines, or deny them access to certain categories of employment alto-
gether, such as night work. Enhancing/positive measures require
employers to give pregnant workers special treatment that they are not
obliged to give non-pregnant workers.
As exceptions to the principle of equal treatment, both types of
protective measures should meet the requirements of Article 2(3) of the
Equal Treatment Directive, which states: "This Directive shall be with-
out prejudice to provisions concerning the protection of women,
particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity." As mentioned be-
fore, "pregnancy" and "maternity" should be given a narrow
construction. Herein lies the core of what is wrong with the Pregnancy
Directive: it has gone beyond biological sex differences and has rein-
forced women in their social (and not merely biological) role of
32. See, e.g., L'UNION EUROPAENNE ET LES DROITS FONDAMENTAUX, STAPHANE LECLERC
ET AL., EDS., 1999.
33. Theoretically, the preamble should be taken into account when construing a directive
(see, e.g., Case 7/75, Mr. and Mrs. F. v. Belgium, [1975] E.C.R. 679, 1 13). How-
ever, by not referring to the Equal Treatment Directive in the Pregnancy Directive
itself, the EC institutions invite the Member States to be guided solely by the convic-
tion that women should be protected. Also Lynn Roseberry noted that the Pregnancy
Directive "does little to dispel the Member States' propensity to restrict women's
employment opportunities under the cover of protecting female (and fetal) health
and safety." LYNN M. RoSEBERRY, THE LIMITS OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 315 (1999).
34. Equal Treatment Directive, sup ra note 12, art. 2(3).
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childrearers. Under the guise of health and safety measures, women are
"protected out" of the workplace. The level of protection that is offered
to women alone is so high that it induces employers to (statistically)
discriminate against women.
The Pregnancy Directive contains many loopholes, which allow the
Member States to keep in force, or even introduce, legislation that runs
counter to the equal opportunities available to men and women in the
EC labor market. 5 Restrictive/negative protective measures may easily
allow escape from the equal treatment principle. Under the guise of pro-
tection, women's career prospects can be seriously diminished. The
discussions sparked by the European Court of Justice's judgments ruling
out national bans on night work for women can illustrate this. In a
number of cases 6 the Court of Justice held that, except in the case of
pregnancy or maternity, the risks to which women are exposed when
working at night are, in general, not different from those to which men
are exposed. As a consequence, the Court concluded that national bans
on night work for women undermined the principle of equal treatment
for men and women. It should be stressed, however, that even posi-
tive/enhancing measures, such as maternity leave, may jeopardize
women's opportunities in the labor market and can, therefore, be coun-
terproductive.37 Those measures add to the costliness of having female
35. For example, Article 8 of the Pregnancy Directive obliges the Member States to en-
sure that a pregnant worker has a right to a minimum of fourteen weeks of maternity
leave, two of which must be obligatory and twelve of which can be made optional.
See Pregnancy Directive, supra note 27, art. 8. The fact that the Pregnancy Directive
allows the Member States to force women workers to take fourteen weeks maternity
leave runs counter to the notion of equal opportunities for men and women in the
EC labor market. According to medical specialists, women need six to eight weeks to
recover from childbirth. See ARLENE EISENBERG ET AL., WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN
YOu'RE EXPECTING 302-04 (1984); PENNY SIMIUN ET AL., PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH
AND THE NEwBoRN 199-202 (1984). Thus, maternity leave beyond eight weeks after
childbirth is not given for the benefit of the mother, but for the benefit of the child.
The fact that those extra weeks of childcare-leave are available to the mother alone re-
inforces the traditional view that mothers should take care of the children.
36. See Case C-345/89, Stoeckel, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4062; Case C-158191, Levy, 1993
E.C.R. 1-4302; Case C-13/93, Office National de l'Emploi v. Minne, 1994 E.C.R I-
376; Case C-197/96, Commission v. French Republic, 1997 E.C.R. 1-1496; Case C-
207/96, Commission v. Italian Republic, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6877.
37. See Fenwick, supra note 16, at 75. Fenwick refers to "special protective provisions"
where I call such measures negative/restrictive. She refers to "special entitlements"
where I refer to positive/enhancing measures.
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employees and, thus, may contribute to the "statistical discrimination"
of women."s
The Pregnancy Directive extracted from the equality debate select
pregnancy and maternity issues. Generally speaking, the Directive pro-
tects women in specific ways during pregnancy, maternity leave granted
by the Member States on the basis of the Directive, and breastfeeding. 9
The mere existence of the Pregnancy Directive and its inherent
over-emphasis of the sui generis position of the pregnant worker have
far-reaching consequences on the application of the principle of equal
treatment between working men and women. The Pregnancy Directive
has institutionalized the incomparability of pregnancy with any other
situation a male or female worker may find himself or herself in. Given
that incomparability, the Aristotelian equality paradigm 0 inevitably
leads to the conclusion that a pregnant worker may be treated com-
pletely different than any other worker in any other situation.
III. THE PROBLEMATIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EQUAL
TREATMENT AND PREGNANCY DIRECTIVES: THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE'S APPROACH
IN BOYLE AND LEWEN
Recent case law from the European Court of Justice illustrates that
lifting pregnancy out of the equality debate and giving it special protec-
tion does not necessarily entail a victory for working women. The
38. See, e.g., Helen Fenvick & Tamara K. Hervey, Sex Equality in the Single Market: New
Directions for the Court ofjustice, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 443, 446 (1995), quoted
in G.F. Mancini & S. O'Leary, The New Frontiers of Sex Equality in the European
Union, 24 Eua. L. REv. 331, 337 (1994).
39. The Pregnancy Directive directs Member States to protect pregnant and breastfeed-
ing workers against hazardous agents, processes or working conditions; it requires
Member States to make an alternative to night work available to female workers, be-
fore and after childbirth; it obliges Member States to grant pregnant workers a
continuous period of maternity leave of at least fourteen weeks allocated before
and/or after childbirth; it urges Member States to ensure that pregnant workers are
entitled to attend pre-natal examinations; it prohibits dismissal during the period
from the beginning of pregnancy to the end of maternity leave; it requires the Mem-
ber States to safeguard a worker's employment rights connected with her
employment contract while she is taking maternity leave. However, during the period
of maternity leave, payment can be replaced by an adequate allowance.
40. Aristotle's definition of equality required that like cases be treated alike, and unlike
cases unalike, in proportion to their unlikeness. ARSTOTE, NIcoMACHEAN ETHICS
122-28 (Terence Irwin trans., Mackett 1985).
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Court's interpretation of the Pregnancy Directive shows that, in an at-
tempt to level the playing field for working women (by accommodating
pregnancy), the Pregnancy Directive in fact adds to gender discrimina-
tion. Such is undoubtedly contrary to the spirit of the Equal Treatment
Directive, which guarantees equal treatment for men and women in
employment.
A. Boyle and Others v. Equal Opportunities Commission (1998) 1
The Court of Justice interpreted the Pregnancy Directive for the
first time in Boyle. The Court's answer to the technical questions put
forward by the British court clearly illustrates that the relationship be-
tween the Equal Treatment Directive and the Pregnancy Directive is
ambiguous. Boyle shows that the Pregnancy Directive drew an arbitrary
line between pregnant working women, to whom the Equal Treatment
Directive still applies and, women who are on maternity leave, to whom
the Pregnancy Directive is applicable.
Ms. Boyle and her colleagues applied to the Industrial Tribunal,
Manchester, for a declaration that certain conditions of their employ-
ment contract were void or unenforceable because they discriminated
against female employees. In particular, they claimed incompatibility
with Article 141 of the EC Treaty and the Equal Pay, Equal Treatment
and Pregnancy Directives.42 The Industrial Tribunal decided to stay the
proceedings in order to refer five questions to the European Court of
Justice for a preliminary ruling. 3
The first question concerned the admissibility of a clause in the
employment contract that made payment during the period of mater-
nity leave, referred to in the Pregnancy Directive, higher than the
statutory payments conditioned on the woman's agreement to return to
work after the birth of the child. If the woman did not return, she
would be required to repay the difference between the amount of pay
41. Case C-411/96, Boyle & Others v. Equal Opportunities Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R I-
6411.
42. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6445-48. National judges may refer requests for a prelimi-
nary ruling (regarding the correct interpretation of the Treaties establishing the EC,
or regarding the compatibility of national law with EC law) to the European Court of
Justice. See Boyle 1998 E.C.R at 1-6444.
43. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6448-49.
44. Council Directive 92/85, 1992 O.J. (1.348) 1. Article 8 of the Pregnancy Directive
provides that pregnant workers are entitled to a continuous period of maternity leave
of at least fourteen weeks allocated before and/or after childbirth. Council Directive
92/85 1992 O.J. (L348) at 4.
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she would have received during the period of maternity leave and the
amount of the statutory payments. 5 No such agreement was required in
the case of an absence from work through illness; workers on sick leave
were paid the higher amounts regardless of whether or not they returned
to work.
The Court followed the questionable reasoning of the Advocate-
General 6 and considered the above requirement to be perfectly in line
with the Pregnancy Directive. The Advocate-General reiterated that the
Pregnancy Directive guarantees an adequate allowance during the pe-
riod of maternity leave, which should be "at least equivalent to that
which the worker concerned would receive in the event of a break in her
activities on grounds connected with her state of health, subject to any
ceiling laid down under national legislation."47 Contrary to what the
Commission maintained, he advanced that the Directive refers to "al-
lowances paid by the national social security schemes and not to pay
from the employer in respect of employment."4 8 In other words, accord-
ing to the Advocate-General and the Court of Justice, the Directive
guarantees the amount an ill woman would get from social security au-
thorities, and not the amount an ill woman would receive from her
employer in each individual case.49 Still, the very words of the Preg-
nancy Directive point in the opposite direction: reference is made to the
"worker concerned" and not to an average worker in general.50
The Court then went on to test the clause against the Equal Pay
Directive. Ms. Boyle and her colleagues submitted that for other forms
of paid leave, such as sick leave, employees were entitled to the agreed
salary without having to undertake to return to work at the end of their
leave.
The Court stressed the sui generis character of pregnancy and
maternity. Pregnant workers and workers who have recently given birth
or are breastfeeding are in a vulnerable position, making the right to
45. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6423.
46. E.G. Treaty, OJ. (C340) 181 (1997). "It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General,
acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court, rea-
soned submissions on cases brought before the Court of Justice, in order to assist the
Court in the performance of the task assigned to it." E.G. Treaty art. 222.
47. Pregnancy Directive, supra note 27, art. 11 (3).
48. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6454.
49. The Advocate-General enumerated five unconvincing reasons to come to this conclu-
sion. Case CA-411/96, Boyle & Others v. Equal Opportunities Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R_
1-6411,1-6454.
50. See Petra Foubert & Babette Koopman, Note: Boyle, 2000 S.E.W. 298, 301.
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maternity leave necessary.5 During such time, those workers cannot be
compared to men or women on sick leave.52 After all, maternity leave is
not only intended to protect a woman's biological condition, but also to
safeguard the special relationship between a woman and her child."
Unfortunately, it was the latter aspect that induced the Court to see
maternity leave as being very different from other forms of paid leave,
and led it to hold that women could be treated differently during such
leave.
54
This conclusion is especially difficult to accept since the Pregnancy
Directive did not intend maternity leave to be used as a tool to
safeguard the mother-child relationship. The Pregnancy Directive was
merely meant to protect the health and safety of the pregnant worker
and the worker who has just given birth.55 The idea that maternity leave
is also intended to safeguard the special relationship between a woman
and her child has been imported from judgments that interpreted the
Equal Treatment Directive.56 In those cases, the Court did consider the
equality debate, but its reasoning only resulted in negative consequences
for the women workers concerned. The Court gave too broad an
interpretation to the exception based on pregnancy and maternity and,
in doing so, limited women's employment opportunities in the labor
market.
The Industrial Tribunal's second question related to the retroactive
imposition of maternity leave. As the sickness scheme was more favor-
able financially than the maternity scheme, Ms. Boyle and her
colleagues naturally wanted to take as little maternity leave as possible
and revert to sick leave instead. However, British legislation had limited
that possibility. When a woman is on sick leave with a pregnancy-
related illness before the date on which her maternity leave is to com-
mence, and when she gives birth during that period of sick leave, her
sick leave may retroactively be converted into maternity leave. The date
on which her paid maternity leave commences is brought forward to the
beginning of the sixth week preceding the expected week of childbirth
or to the beginning of the period of sick leave, whichever comes later.
The applicants found this to be discriminatory as, unlike any other
worker who is sick, a female worker who is unfit for work is not able to
51. See Boyle, 1998 E.C.R at 1-6455-56.
52. See Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6455-56.
53. See Boyle, 1998 E.C.K at 1-6456.
54. Boyle, 1998 E.C.K at 1-6406.
55. FOUBERT & KooMmAN, supra note 50, at 301.
56. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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exercise her contractual right to unconditional paid sick leave if her ill-
ness is pregnancy-related and if she gives birth while on sick leave.57
The Court again followed the Advocate-General's opinion. It
decided:
[A]lthough Article 8 of Directive 92/85 provides for a con-
tinuous period of maternity leave of at least 14 weeks,
including compulsory maternity leave of at least two weeks, it
nonetheless leaves open to the Member States to determine the
date on which maternity leave is to commence.... The clause
to which the second question relates merely reflects the choice
made in such national legislation.5"
Neither the Court nor the Advocate-General made any reference to
the Larsson59 and Brown6° cases, which also concerned pregnancy-related
illness that arose before maternity leave. However, the Pregnancy Direc-
tive was not then enacted, and as a consequence, only the Equal
Treatment Directive came into play. While in Larsson and Brown the
discussion focused on the need for a (male) analogy for a woman con-
fronted with pregnancy-related illness beyond maternity leave, that
question was completely absent in the Boyle case. To that extent, the
Boyle case clearly shows that there is no overlap between the scopes of
both the Pregnancy and Equal Treatment Directives. The Court merely
checked whether the Member State had respected the requirements of
the Pregnancy Directive (in casu the date on which maternity leave is to
commence). It recognized that the Pregnancy Directive is an implemen-
tation of Article 2(3) of the Equal Treatment Directive,6' but did not
feel the need to check whether Ms. Boyle and her colleagues had been
discriminated against.62 This is further proof that the Pregnancy Direc-
tive has disconnected the pregnancy debate from the equality debate.
The Industrial Tribunal's third question concerned the clause in
Ms. Boyle and her colleagues' contracts which prohibited them from
57. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6457.
58. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6458.
59. Case C-400/95, Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark (for Lars-
son) v. Dansk Handel & Service (for Fotex Supermarked KS), 1997 E.C.R. 1-2774.
60. Case C-394/96, Mary Brown v. Rentokil Initial UK Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. 1-4224.
61. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R_ at 1-6458.
62. I do not believe that one can deduce from the judgment that the Court decided that
there was no conflict with the Equal Treatment Directive. See Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at
1-6406.
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taking sick leave during the minimum period of fourteen weeks'
maternity leave or the unpaid supplementary period of maternity leave
granted to them by their employer. That prohibition could only be
overcome if they elected to return to work and thus terminate their
maternity leave. 63 Still the applicants argued they should be able to
interrupt their maternity leave, be declared unfit for work on account of
illness and, on recovering, return to their previous position. The Court
ruled that maternity leave as referred to in the Pregnancy Directive
could be interrupted by a period of sick leave.6 The Pregnancy
Directive provides for two weeks of compulsory maternity leave and an
option for twelve additional weeks.65 As a woman may waive the latter
right, the Pregnancy Directive could not prevent her from placing
herself under the sick leave arrangements after the two weeks of
compulsory maternity leave. However, if that sick leave ended before
the expiration of the period of maternity leave, she could not be
deprived of the right to continued enjoyment of maternity leave until
the expiration of the minimum period of fourteen weeks.6 According to
the Court, "Any other interpretation would compromise the purpose of
maternity leave, in so far as that leave is intended to protect not only the
woman's biological condition but also the special relationship between a
woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy and
childbirth." 67
As already mentioned, the Pregnancy Directive aims at protecting
the health and safety of the pregnant worker. To fulfill that purpose, it
forces the pregnant employee to take two weeks' maternity leave" and
gives her the right to add another twelve weeks at her discretion. By giv-
ing a woman the opportunity to interrupt her maternity leave with a
period of sick leave and complete the remaining period of maternity
leave later, the Court acknowledges that the optional twelve weeks of
maternity leave are meant to safeguard the mother-child relationship
rather than to protect the mother's health and safety.69 After all, when a
63. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6459.
64. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6460.
65. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R- at 1-6460.
66. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6460.
67. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6460.
68. By making only two of the fourteen weeks of maternity leave obligatory, the EC
institutions deviated from the view in medical science that, generally speaking,
women need six to eight weeks to physically recover from childbirth. See, e.g.,
EISENBERG aT AL., supra note 35, at 302-04; SIMKIN aT AL., 199-202.
69. FOuBERT & KoopmaN, supra note 50, 301-02. The Court itself referred to the dou-
ble aim of maternity leave. BoyLe, 1998 E.C.R., at 1-6460. In doing so, the Court
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woman decides to go on sick leave while on maternity leave, this implies
that her condition is not related to pregnancy or childbirth,70 for other-
wise maternity leave would cover the situation. When a woman
considers that her illness is no longer related to pregnancy or childbirth
and, as a consequence, interrupts her maternity leave, the completion of
the remaining period of maternity leave cannot be connected with her
health and safety. Indeed, in that case, both her maternity leave and her
sick leave should come to an end.
The Advocate-General's ideas regarding this question were more
coherent, but unfortunately the Court did not adopt his reasoning this
time. He rejected the possibility of interrupting maternity leave by a
period of sick leave for three reasons. 7' First, he stressed that apart from
the two weeks compulsory leave, workers can waive the right to mater-
nity leave.72 Second, he pointed out that the Pregnancy Directive
provides clearly that maternity leave is to comprise a continuous period
of at least fourteen weeks. It would not therefore be possible to divide it
into separate time periods.7 Third, he considered that the Pregnancy
Directive allows national authorities to make the payment or allowance
during maternity leave conditional upon the woman concerned fulfill-
ing certain conditions of eligibility for such benefits.74 He highlighted
that "[t]he possibility of treating maternity leave as having ended and
being given paid sick leave will, for a woman who falls ill after giving
birth and is not entitled to receive any income during maternity leave,
offer indubitable advantages."
75
The Court allowed the employer to prohibit his female workers
from taking sick leave during the additional leave granted to them by
the employer on top of the 14 week maternity leave provided in the
Pregnancy Directive. On the one hand, such a clause does not fall
within the scope of the Pregnancy Directive, since it concerns maternity
allowed major inroads into women's employment opportunities. The Court's seeing
maternity leave as a way to protect the special mother-child relationship reinforced
the idea that women are better at childrearing than men, and that they should be
given extra leave for it. This notion makes women less attractive employees.
70. Neither the Court nor the Advocate-General specified whether the woman's condi-
tion concerned pregnancy or non-pregnancy-related illness. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. I-
6406.
71. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6433.
72. Boyle, 1998 E.C.tR at 1-6433.
73. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6433.
74. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6433.
75. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6433.
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leave granted on top of what is guaranteed by the Pregnancy Directive. 76
On the other hand, the clause does fall within the scope of the Equal
Treatment Directive, but according to the Court, "the principle of non-
discrimination laid down in Article 5 of Directive 76/207 does not re-
quire a woman to be able to exercise simultaneously both the right to
supplementary maternity leave granted to her by the employer and the
right to sick leave." 7
The Court did not feel obliged to check whether the employer also
provided the possibility for fathers to take parental leave and, if that
were the case, whether fathers were also required to terminate their
parental leave in the event of illness. 78 The Advocate-General defended
the questionable view that additional leave for women only is a measure
covered by Article 2(3) of the Equal Treatment Directive and does not
therefore constitute discrimination.79 As noted before, Article 2(3)
should be given a strict interpretation and should not be read to refer to
anything more than a woman's biological make-up."' Still, the
Advocate-General did understand some of the problematic aspects of
the interpretation he offered to the Court, as he stated:
Quite apart from the fact that I consider that reserving solely
to women the availability of unpaid leave to look after a new-
born child does not help to promote equality of opportunity
between the sexes, since what it does in reality is to perpetuate
in society the idea that it is women who as a matter of priority
should take care of the children-with all the concomitant ad-
verse effects on their future careers-I do not share the view
put forward by the applicants.3'
The fourth and fifth questions presented in Boyle concerned the in-
terpretation of Article 11(2)(a) of the Pregnancy Directive, which
requires the Member States to safeguard a worker's rights under her
employment contract while she is taking the maternity leave provided in
the Directive.82 The Court interpreted the Article to mean that annual
76. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6461.
77. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6461.
78. FOUBERT & KoopmAN, supra note 50, at 302. It appears from the opinion of Advo-
cate-General Colomer that in the United Kingdom only women may take additional
unpaid leave to look after a newborn child.
79. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6460.
80. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
81. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6460.
82. Pregnancy Directive, supra note 27, art. 11(2)(a).
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vacation leave should accrue during the period of maternity leave female
workers are entitled to under the Pregnancy Directive. The same ap-
plied to the accrual of pension rights,' and the Court clearly stated that
such accrual could not be made conditional upon the woman's receiving
the pay provided for by her employment contract or statutory maternity
pay during that period. Article 11(2) (a) of the Directive unconditionally
guarantees the respect of rights connected with the employment con-
85tract.
The fact that no annual vacation leave accrued during additional
unpaid leave presented the Court with a more problematic and contro-
versial issue. Ms. Boyle and her colleagues claimed that such a provision
constituted indirect (i.e. covert) discrimination on grounds of sex, pro-
hibited by the Equal Treatment Directive.86 Since a substantially greater
proportion of women than men take periods of unpaid leave (because
they take supplementary maternity leave), that rule, which is ostensibly
gender-neutral, would apply to a greater percentage of women than
men. 7 The Court, however, did not follow the applicants' view and rea-
soned:
[T]he fact that such a clause applies more frequently to
women results from the exercise of the right to unpaid mater-
nity leave granted to them by their employers in addition to
the period of protection guaranteed by Article 8 of [the Preg-
nancy Directive].
Female workers who exercise that right subject to the condi-
tion that annual leave ceases to accrue during the period of
unpaid leave cannot be regarded as at a disadvantage com-
pared to male workers. The supplementary unpaid maternity
leave constitutes a special advantage, over and above the pro-
tection provided for by [the Pregnancy Directive] and is
available only to women, so that the fact that annual leave
83. Case C-411/96, Boyle & Others v. Equal Opportunities Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R. at I-
6411, 1-6462. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6462.
84. Boyle, 1998 E.C.RI at 1-6465.
85. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6466.
86. Boyle, 1998 E.C.RI at 1-6463.
87. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6463.
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ceases to accrue during that period of leave cannot amount to
less favourable treatment of women.88
Apart from the discussion as to whether annual leave should accrue
during unpaid leave, the Court's reasoning is flawed. The key problem
is that men do not have a right to parental leave. Separating unpaid ad-
ditional maternity leave from all other forms of unpaid leave, by
bringing it under Article 2(3) of the Equal Treatment Directive, makes
an easy transfer to indirect (i.e. covert) discrimination. One form of dis-
crimination masks the other. An extreme hypothetical example may
clarify this point. If nursing jobs were only available to women, alleg-
edly because their biological make-up renders them specially suited to
work as nurses, and if authorities then lowered nurses' minimum wages,
could we conclude that indirect (i.e. covert) discrimination is out of the
picture as only women can be nurses?89 That does not seem to be the
spirit of the Equal Treatment Directive.
In the recent Schnorbus case, this was nevertheless the Court's posi-
tion.9"
Ms. Schnorbus was refused admission to practical legal training af-
ter a selection was made in accordance with legal provisions under
which men who have completed compulsory military or civilian service
were to be immediately admitted to the training. The admission of
other applicants (male and female) could be deferred up to twelve
months.1 Ms. Schnorbus objected to such treatment as contrary to the
Equal Treatment Directive on several grounds.92 The German court de-
cided to stay the proceedings and refer a number of questions to the
Court of Justice,13 one of which related to the presence of indirect (i.e.
covert) sex discrimination. 9'
The Court easily might have reasoned, by analogy to Boyle, that the
group of persons who completed military or civilian service is distin-
guished from all others by a legal provision based on an objective factor,
thereby allowing for differential treatment. After all, one could maintain
that it is perfectly acceptable to require only men to complete military
88. Boyle, 1998 E.C.R. at 1-6464.
89. FOUBERT & KoopmAN, supra note 50, at 302.
90. Case C-79/99, Schnorbusv. Hessen, available at http://eurmpa-eu.tindlenjurisp/index-hrm
91. Schnorbus, 1 14-15. The legal provisions referred to can be found in the German
Juristenausbildungsordnung (Legal Training Regulations).
92. Schnorbus, 16.
93. Schnorbus, 20.
94. Schnorbus, ' 20.
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service as they are physically better suited for such endeavors.
95 Advo-
cate-General Jacobs defended a similar line of thought in his claim that
the indirect (i.e. covert) discrimination against women in admission to
practical training could be justified on the basis of objective factors.
96 He
stated:
The rule in issue is designed to compensate for (or perhaps
rather to avoid exacerbating) a delay of approximately one year
in the commencement of legal studies. That disadvantage is
defined objectively and applies to members of one sex only
because the law (for the time being) imposes it on members of
one sex only.97
However, the Court of Justice decided not to start from the above-
mentioned traditional conviction with respect to women in the military
and stated:
It is sufficient to note that, by giving priority to applicants
who have completed compulsory military or civilian service,
the provisions at issue themselves are evidence of indirect
discrimination since, under the relevant national legislation,
women are not required to do military or civilian service and
therefore cannot benefit from the priority accorded by the
above-mentioned provisions of the JAO to applications in
circumstances regarded as cases of hardship.
95. In his opinion, Advocate-General Jacobs noted that "there is a distinction to be
drawn between a criterion based on an obligation imposed by law on one sex alone
and a criterion based on a physical characteristic inherent in one sex alone. No
amount of legislation can render men capable of bearing children, whereas legislation
might readily remove any discrimination between men and women in relation to
compulsory national service." Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered in Case
C-79/99, Schnorbus, 140. Taking this view into account, my comparison between
Boyle and Schnorbus is correct. In both cases, the inequality between the male and
female situations is caused by legislation, and not by physical difference between men
and women, (e.g., legislation offering supplementary maternity leave to women alone
in Boyle, and legislation obliging only men to complete military service in Schnorbus.)
96. Schnorbus, 1 49.
97. Schnorbus, 1 49.
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The answer to the third question must therefore be that na-
tional provisions such as those at issue in the main proceedings
constitute indirect discrimination based on sex.98
The Court rightly held that the unequal treatment of women in the
admission to practical legal training was in fact caused by their exclusion
from military service (i.e., direct discrimination). 99 As a consequence,
the Court concluded that women were indirectly (i.e., covertly) dis-
criminated against when they could not benefit from certain advantages
offered to the group of people who did complete military service.'00
B. Lewen v. Lothar Denda (1999)0'
In 1996, Mrs. Lewen was on maternity leave and then took parent-
ing leave for a period ending in July 1999. On December 1, 1996, Mrs.
Lewen did not get her usual Christmas bonus. She commenced an ac-
tion before the national court, which stayed the proceedings pending a
preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice. The national court's ques-
tions mainly concerned the interpretation of the Parental Leave
Directive (1996),' °0 but also required some explanation of the Preg-
nancy Directive. °3
The national court sought to ascertain whether a Christmas bonus,
which is paid mainly or exclusively as an incentive for future work or
loyalty to the undertaking,' ° falls within the concept of pay under Ard-
cle 11(2) (b) of the Pregnancy Directive, which guarantees "maintenance
of a payment to, and/or entitlement to an adequate allowance for,
[pregnant] workers."'' The Court reiterated that, from a combination
98. Schnorbus, 38-39.
99. Note that the Court did not explicitly expand on the question of whether or not this
type of direct discrimination can be justified. The Court seemed to assume that it
could not be justified.
100. Schnorbus, 1 38-39.
101. Case C-333/97, Lewen v. Denda, 1999 E.C.R. 1-7243.
102. Council Directive 96/34, 1996 O.J. (L145) Annex § 11:2. See supra note 21. The
Parental Leave Directive grants men and women workers an individual right to at
least three months of parental leave on the grounds of the birth or adoption of a
child. The interpretation of this Directive also raises interesting questions with re-
spect to sex equality and discrimination. However, a discussion of those questions
would go beyond the scope of this article, which only deals with the links between
pregnancy protection and the equality debate.
103. Lewen, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-7250-52.
104. Lewen, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-7253.
105. Pregnancy Directive, supra note 27 at art. 11(2)(b).
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of said Article with Article 11(3) of the Pregnancy Directive, '0 6 one
could conclude that female workers should receive, during maternity
leave, an income at least equal to what a worker would receive in case of
illness. It would be irrelevant whether that income is paid in the form of
an allowance, the form of pay by the employer, or a combination of the
107
two.
The Court of Justice produced a very short answer.
Not being intended to ensure such a level of income during a
worker's maternity leave, the bonus at issue in the main pro-
ceedings cannot be regarded as falling within the concept of
payment within the meaning of Article 11(2)(b) of the Preg-
nancy Directive.'OS
Again the disadvantage of separating the pregnancy debate from
the equality debate becomes apparent. As the Pregnancy Directive does
not require anything other than guaranteeing women an income that
should at least be equal to what they would get in case of illness, women
on maternity leave cannot claim any right to a Christmas bonus. There-
fore, discrimination is not an issue, since it involves the application of
different rules to comparable situations, or the application of the same
rule to different situations. The Pregnancy Directive has made women
on maternity leave a sui generis category, rendering a comparison with
any other condition impossible. The Court's only obligation is to check
whether the Pregnancy Directive has been respected, which is precisely
what it did.
From the Court's judgment, one cannot determine whether a
Christmas bonus would fall within the scope of Article 11(2) (a) of the
Pregnancy Directive, which protects rights connected with the
employment contract other than pay during maternity leave. 109
However, according to the Advocate-General, it would be perfectly in
line with former case law of the Court of Justice to consider a Christmas
bonus to be such a right."' This would imply that the reason for
awarding the bonus (i.e. as incentive for future work, loyalty to the firm,
or work performed in the past) is irrelevant insofar as women on
106. Pregnancy Directive, supra note 27, art. 11(3).
107. Lewen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-7243, 1-7255 (citing Boyle).
108. Lewen, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-7255.
109. Pregnancy Directive, supra note 27, art. 11(3).
110. Lewen, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-7256.
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maternity leave are concerned."' A woman who is on maternity leave
would in all cases retain the right to a Christmas bonus, as that bonus
constitutes a right connected with her employment contract, irrespective
of whether it is connected with past or future work. It is sufficient that
the employment contract still exists, which is certainly the case for a
worker who is on maternity leave.
However, it is problematic that Advocate-General Colomer did not
make a distinction in his analysis between the payment of a Christmas
bonus that is voluntary, on the one hand, and a Christmas bonus to
which a worker has a right on the other. He assumed that a worker al-
ways has a right to a Christmas bonus, while the Court of Justice clearly
asserted that the case at hand concerned a bonus that is paid voluntarily
by the employer. This may explain why the Court did not discuss
whether the bonus came within the scope of Article 11(2)(a) of the
Pregnancy Directive. The Court might have assumed that a worker
could never have a right to a voluntary payment by his or her employer.
Although a worker who is on maternity leave would, as I suggested
above, retain her right to a Christmas bonus, that does not alter the fact
that the Court merely checks whether or not the allowance of a Christ-
mas bonus (or a refusal thereof) meets the requirements of the
111. Lewen, 1999 E.C.Rt at 1-7283. The classification of the bonus is relevant, however,
when the refusal of payment of a bonus to women on parenting leave is concerned.
Such a case comes within the scope of Article 141 (ex Article 119) EC Treaty, requir-
ing equal pay for work of equal value. The Court stated:
mhe finding that an advantage such as the Christmas bonus at issue in
this case falls within the concept of pay as broadly defined in Article 119 of
the Treaty does not necessarily imply that it must be regarded as retroactive
pay for work performed in the course of the year in which the bonus is
paid, as the national court seems to assume. That, however, is a question of
fact which is a matter to be appraised by the national court in the light of
its national law.
Lewen, 1999 E.C.R_ at 1-7280.
The Court concluded that:
Article 119 of the Treaty precludes an employer from excluding female
workers on parenting leave entirely from the benefit of a bonus paid volun-
tarily as an exceptional allowance at Christmas without taking account of
the work done in the year in which the bonus is paid or of the periods for
the protection of mothers (in which they were prohibited from working)
where that bonus is awarded retroactively as pay for work performed in the
course of that year. However, [Article 119 does not preclude] a refusal to
pay such a bonus to a woman on parenting leave where the award of that
allowance is subject to the sole condition that the worker must be in active
employment when it is awarded.
Lewen, 1999 E.C.R. at 1-7283.
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Pregnancy Directive. Neither the Court nor the Advocate-General re-
ferred to the principle of equality between men and women in the labor
market. The Pregnancy Directive was the only guideline, and was again
used to separate the pregnancy and equality debates.
CONCLUSIONS
The Pregnancy Directive has taken pregnancy out of the equality
debate. Classifying pregnancy as a sui generis condition, in an attempt to
rule out discrimination of women in the labor market, results in the loss
of any point of reference for the treatment of pregnancy, thereby allow-
ing the enforcement of certain forms of gender discrimination. It follows
that it is crucial to always study pregnancy against an equality-
background.
In pregnancy discrimination discourse, it is often advanced that the
comparative standard should be left out of the equality debate since the
standard is usually male (mostly the "ill man"), thereby producing
inadequate results.'12 Comparison, however, is an essential element of
the equality debate, and, upon closer consideration, it appears that it is
not so much the comparative theory that is defective, but rather its
application.
One could argue that there is nothing wrong with comparing a
pregnant woman to a sick man. In doing so, pregnancy is not degraded
to a mere illness; rather, the situation of both conditions in the labor
market are aligned.13 Still, during the period needed for physical
112. See, e.g., Gillian More, Reflections on Pregnancy Discrimination under European Com-
munity Law, 1 J. Soc. WEixmms & FAu. L. 48, 55 (1992).
113. Wintemute states:
mhe comparison is not between the desirable and socially important
condition of pregnancy and the undesirable condition of illness, but
between needs arising from pregnancy (for leave with pay) and needs
arising from illness (for leave with pay). As Paul Davies has observed, 'from
an employer's point of view, the relevant fact is not the precise nature of
the physical condition giving rise to unavailability for work, but the
unavailability for work itself and its likely duration.'
Robert Wintemute, When is Pregnancy Discrimination Indirect Sex Discrimination?,
27 INDus. LJ. 23, 34-35 (1998) (citing Paul Davies, The European Court ofJustice,
the National Courts and the Member States, in EuRoPEAN COMMUNrnr LABOUR LAw:
PRINCIPLES AND PERSPECTIVES. 95, 126 (Paul Davies et al., eds. 1996)). See also Eve-
lyn Ellis, Recent Developments in European Community Sex Equality Law, 35
COMMON MKr L. Ray. 379, 395 (1998); Rubenstein, supra note 25, at 22.
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recovery after childbirth, a woman finds herself in a very unique
biological situation that is incomparable to any other situation. During
this relatively short period, a woman can, in accordance with Article
2(3) of the Equal Treatment Directive, be treated differently, but only
with a view to creating substantive equal opportunities for women in
the labor market. The Pregnancy Directive clearly fails in this pursuit. It
has given too broad an interpretation to the term "maternity" as referred
to in Article 2(3) of the Equal Treatment Directive and reinforces the
stigma placed on women in their social roles of childbearers and
childrearers.
The core problem is not the comparative element, but rather the
gender discriminatory societal reality: most women still carry alone the
burden of having and raising children. And what is more, the latter is
considered the normal situation. Still, having children, in most cases,
involves a deliberate choice by a woman and a man." 4 Responsibility,
including career breaks and the financial consequences of having chil-
dren, should be equally distributed between the mother and father of
the child."5
If the burden of having children were to be equally distributed, it
would be easier to apply the equality paradigm, including its compara-
tive standard, to the pregnancy issue. However, as long as pregnancy
legislation does not target sex discrimination and the underlying gender
discrimination at the same time, it will never produce equal opportuni-
ties for men and women in the labor market. t
114. Also, Christine Boch voiced the opinion that the traditional methodology for examin-
ing discrimination is limited for two reasons. The first one being the reliance on a
male norm and the second one being the lack of a satisfactory answer to the question
of who should bear the social cost of pregnancy and childbearing. Christine Boch,
Note: Webb, 33 COMMON MKT L. REv. 547, 553-554 (1996).
115. See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1279,
1297 (1987), cited in Sandra Fredman, A Difference with Distinction: Pregnancy and
Parenthood Reassessed, 110 L. Q. REv. 106, 121 (1994). See also Titia Loenen, Sub-
stantive Equality as a Right to Inclusion: Dilemma's and Limits in Law, 24 RECHTSFIL.
& RECHTSTHEORIE 194, 199 (1995).
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